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The Hidden Potential of Regulatory Impact Assessments
(RIAs) in the Private Law Acquis
ESTHER VAN SCHAGEN*
Summary: This article argues that regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) are an
important method to improve the private law acquis that are currently overlooked.
Many problems of unpredictability and inconsistency can be traced to poor regulatory
choices in the private law acquis, including the overenthusiastic use of blanket clauses
and the lack of coordination in the development of the acquis. RIAs are a very suitable
means to prompt the legislator to reconsider these choices. The use of RIAs however
currently shows severe shortcomings. Particularly, RIAs frequently contain doubtful
and unsubstantiated assumptions, and they do not neutrally assess the benefits and
detriments of all possible ways to develop the acquis. These shortcomings should be
addressed if RIAs are to contribute to the quality of the private law acquis. A more
thorough evaluation of past and future measures such as minimum and maximum
harmonization, guidance, databases, and self-regulation and more coordination would
contribute to the predictability and consistency of the private law acquis.
Résumé: Cet article propose que les analyses d’impact sont un moyen important pour
améliorer l’acquis de droit privé qui est maintenaint négligé. Beaucoup des problèmes
d’imprévibilité et inconsistance peuvent être attribués aux mauvais choix politiques,
ainsi que le trop enthousiast emploi des clauses générales et l’absence de coordination
dans la formation de l’acquis. Les analyses d’impact sont un moyen apte à inciter le
législateur à réviser ces choix. Toutefois, des erreurs graves se présentent dans
l’emploi des analyses d’impact, en particulier les hypothèses douteux et le défaut
d’une analyse neutre des bénéfices et des détriments de tous moyens possibles pour
développer l’acquis. Si les analyses des impacts pourraient s’améliorer la qualité
del’acquis de droit privé, il faut que ces fautes seront rectifiés.
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Aufsatz legt dar dass Ex-ante-Folgenabschätzungen eine
wichtige Methode sind um das privatrechtliche Acquis zu verbesseren, die jetzt aber
unberücksichtigt sind. Viele Problemen der Unvorhersagbarkeit und Inkonsistenz
können auf schlechte politische Entscheidungen zurückgefuhrt werden, wie auch eine
allzu begeisterte Verwendung der Generalklauseln. Folgenabschätzungen sind eine
sehr geeignete Weise um den Gesetzgeber zu veranlassen diese Entscheidungen aufs
Neue zu überdenken. Allerdings sind jetzt schwere Fehler in der Benützung von
Folgenabschätzungen zu bespüren, insbesondere zweifelhafte und ununtermauerte
Annahmen und die Mangel einer neutrale Analyse der Vor- und Nachteile aller
möglichen Weisen um das Acquis weiter zu entwickeln. Diese Fehler müssen
korrigiert werden, sonst können Folgenabschätzungen die Qualität des
privatrechtlichen Acquis nicht verbessern.
* Postdoctoral research fellow to the Endowed Chair for the Groningen Center of Law and
Governance.
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1. Introduction
The private law acquis generally aims to advance the internal market, as well as
consumer protection, in accordance with the European legislator’s competence
under Article 114 TFEU. Regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) are a relatively
recent and important tool in the programme for Better Regulation1 and should
help the private law acquis to achieve these aims. RIAs are non-binding reports
that precede legislative proposals and action plans and that assess the impacts of
these proposals and action plans. Generally, RIAs should outline the benefits and
detriments of various policy options and increase informed decision-making. RIAs
should also enable interested parties to gain more insight in decision-makers’
choices to pursue competing objectives, thereby increasing transparent
decision-making.2
RIAs are a relatively new instrument. For the private law acquis, RIAs have
been introduced since the proposal for a directive on unfair commercial
practices.3 Typically, RIAs should assess the impacts of various possible measures
for harmonizing private law, indicating whether improving the internal market
and consumer protection may conflict and highlighting which measure is best
suited to improve the functioning of the internal market or consumer protection.
Thus, RIAs may improve transparent decision-making by making clear on which
reasoning decisions have been based and outlining the benefits and detriments of
proposals and alternatives. Currently, RIAs accompanying proposals in the area of
private law typically ensure the reader of the benefits of proposed measures in
rather exact numbers.
RIAs have received very little attention in the debate on European private
law. Civil lawyers are not generally familiar with the use of RIAs. Possibly, this
unfamiliarity with RIAs can be traced to the controversy whether private law, at
the national level, pursues a particular policy aim.4 Also, academics involved in
the development of the acquis may be motivated by the interesting discussions on
1 Communication from the Commission, Action Plan ‘Simplifying and improving the regulatory
environment’, COM (2002) 278 final.
2 Communication from the Commission on Impact Assessment, COM (2002) 276 final.
3 SEC (2003) 724 final. Other impact assessment reports are the impact assessment accompanying
the proposal for a reformed directive on timeshare and related products, SEC (2007) 743 final;
the impact assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive on consumer rights, available
at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/impact_assessment_report_en.pdf; the impact
assessment report on the review of the securities prospectus directive, SEC (2009) 1223; the
impact assessment report accompanying the proposal for a directive on mortgage credit, SEC
(2011) 356; and the impact assessment report accompanying the proposal for a directive on
consumer ADR and a regulation on consumer ODR, SEC (2011) 1409 final.
4 Compare for example T.F.E. TJONG TJIN TAI, ‘Twintig jaar Nieuw BW: Bijzondere
overeenkomsten’, Ars Aequi 2012, p. 872, who finds that the instrumentalization of private law is
difficult to reconcile with the classic idea of a coherent system of private law striving for justice.
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material private law (‘When is a contract formed? What common requirements for
torts can be discovered throughout the Union?’) rather than the question how the
functioning of the internal market or consumer protection should be enhanced.
Thus, the focus in preparing materials for further developing the private law
acquis may be on common principles or elements underlying divergent private
laws. Consequently, the legal basis for a measure is considered only after a
measure has been drafted. This line of reasoning differs from asking whether
harmonization will enhance the functioning of the internal market or whether
harmonization will improve consumer protection, and in what way these aims can
best be achieved. As a result, the potential of RIAs is currently overlooked.
However, even if private lawyers were familiar with the use of RIAs and
even if private law was developed differently, problems would remain. Severe
shortcomings are visible in the use of RIAs in the private law acquis. This paper
will argue that if these shortcomings are remedied, RIAs may prove to be an
important means to improve the private law acquis.
Paragraph 2 will discuss the criticism of the private law acquis and link this
criticism to poor regulatory choices that can be reconsidered by RIAs. Paragraph 3
will indicate the shortcomings in the use of RIAs in the private law acquis, and
paragraph 4 will indicate starting points for improving the use of RIAs. Paragraph 5
will end with a conclusion.
2. Criticism of the Private Law Acquis
The quality of the private law acquis has rightly been subject to severe criticism.5
Paragraph 2.1 will set out the most visible deficiencies currently visible in the
private law acquis. Paragraph 2.2 will argue that these deficiencies can be traced
to poor regulatory choices. Finally, paragraph 2.3 will point out that, without
reconsideration, which can be prompted by RIAs, these choices will likely
continue.
2.1. Shortcomings in the Private Law Acquis
The private law acquis has been criticized for its lack of predictability for the
inconsistent measures within the private law acquis and inconsistencies within
national private laws that have become visible after directives have been
implemented. Also, problems of accessibility have become visible.
Firstly, unpredictability arises as measures in the private law acquis
frequently use ambiguous phrases or blanket clauses (open normen,
Generalklauseln) that have to be interpreted autonomously. The meaning and
correct interpretation of these terms may be difficult to predict, and the CJEU has
5 See especially J.M. SMITS, ‘European Private Law: A Plea for a Spontaneous Legal Order’, in
D.M. Curtin et al. (eds), European Integration and Law, Intersentia, Antwerp-Oxford 2006.
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interpreted terms in a manner that has surprised practitioners and state actors
who may base their expectations on national law. A well-known example of a
surprising decision – at least for some Member States – is Océano,6 in which the
CJEU found that judges have an obligation to interpret these terms ex officio,
which has resulted in resistance at the national level.7 Moreover, it may take
considerable time before ambiguous terms or blanket clauses are submitted before
the CJEU, which increases the period in which a lack of certainty on the correct
interpretation of terms is established. As a result, uncertainty on the
interpretation of key concepts in directives may persist for a considerable time.8
The low frequency with which cases are brought before Dutch courts may
further diminish the number of cases that might be brought before the CJEU. As
apparent from experience with Regulation 261/2004 on air passenger rights, this
lack of contention may be traced to the lack of awareness consumers actually have
of their rights.9 Also, even if consumers are aware of their rights, it is not always
cost-effective to enforce them, as consumers typically have small financial stakes
and adjudication is expensive and time-consuming. In The Netherlands, where
successful self-regulation has developed,10 as well as Alternative dispute
resolution (ADR),11 consumer organizations have not filed many claims.12 Claims
from consumer organizations may also be decreased if they have to negotiate
before they can file a claim, as, for example, required in Article 6:240 paragraph
4 BW.
Secondly, identical concepts in the private law acquis, such as ‘unfair’, are
interpreted differently. For example, ‘unfairness’ in the sense of Article 3
Directive 93/13 may differ from ‘unfairness’ in the sense of Directive 2005/29.
As the unfair contract terms directive pursues minimum harmonization, leaving
room for more stringent protection under national law, it has been argued that
this standard, implemented in national law, may also be interpreted more strictly
6 CJEU 27 Jun. 2000, joined cases C-240/98 to C-244/98, Océano Grupo v. Quintero [2000] ECR
4941.
7 HR 23 Apr. 2010, NJ (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie) 2010, p. 454.
8 D. FAIRGRIEVE, G. HOWELLS & M. PILGERSTORFER, ‘The Product Liability Directive: Time
to Get Soft?’, 4. Journal of European Tort Law 2013, p. 1.
9 See the evaluation of this measure, COM (2011) 174 final.
10 For example, many STCs used by Dutch businesses are the result of collective negotiations
between consumer organisations and businesses within the framework of the Sociaal-
Economische Raad (SER).
11 See www.degeschillencommissie.nl. Decisions by this committee are not consistently published.
12 C.M.D.S. PAVILLON, Open normen in het Europees consumentenrecht, Kluwer, Deventer 2011,
at p. 505, points out that, in The Netherlands, individual enforcement is the primary remedy of a
breach of collective rights that has not been established. See further on collective redress M.B.M.
LOOS & W.H. VAN BOOM, Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law, Europa Law Publishing,
Groningen 2007.
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in favour of the consumer,13 and the CJEU has indicated the relevance of national
laws for the evaluation of the fairness of terms.14 Yet national law may not be
similarly relevant in assessing whether a commercial practice is unfair in the
sense of Directive 2005/29 that pursues maximum harmonization.
Also, the relation between potentially overlapping measures may give rise
to unpredictability and inconsistency. For example, questions have arisen on the
admissibility of choice of jurisdiction clauses under the unfair contract terms
directive and Article 17 Regulation 44/2001.15 Similarly, the simultaneous
applicability of Directive 93/13 and the Montréal Convention has led to
conflicts.16
Thirdly, inconsistency has developed as measures in the private law acquis
have frequently used terms already used in national law, such as ‘consumer’ or
‘unfair’. Notably, the interpretation of these terms in the acquis by the CJEU may
differ from the interpretation of these terms in national law by national courts. As
a result, identical terms within the same codification can have different
meanings.17 Inconsistency is worsened by the lack of interaction between national
courts in some Member States in the interpretation of blanket clauses in the
acquis.18
Fourthly, the extent to which harmonization improves the predictability,
consistency, and accessibility of private law to foreign parties is overrated. In
contrast to the reasoning in directives,19 the extent to which harmonization, even
13 Comp. H. HEINRICHS, ‘Das Gesetz zur Änderung des AGB-Gesetzes Umsetzung der EG-Richtlinie
über mißbräuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen durch den Bundesgesetzgeber’, NJW (Neue
JuristischeWochenschrift) 1996, p. 2196.
14 CJEU 14 Mar. 2013, C-415/11 Aziz v. Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona i Manresa
(Catalunyacaixa) [2013] ECR 0.
15 M.W. KNIGGE, ‘Tegenstrijdige Europese regelgeving? De verhouding tussen de EEX-verordening
en de Richtlijn oneerlijke bedingen’, MvV (Maandblad van Vermogensrecht) 2012, p. 95.
16 At first sight, clauses in accordance with the Montréal Convention should be permitted in
accordance with Art. 1 para. 2 Directive 93/13, but BGH 5 Dec. 2006, NJW 2007, p. 997, found
a clause in accordance with Art. 17 Convention unfair.
17 W.-H. ROTH, ‘Transposing “Pointillist” EC Guidelines into Systemic National Codes – Problems
and Consequences’, ERPL 2002, p. 774.
18 Thus, Kantonrechter Tiel 15 Jun. 2005, Prg. (Praktijkgids) 2005, p. 143, upheld a clause
automatically renewing a subscription trial and interpreted Arts 6:236 and 237 BW – establishing
a list of respectively black and grey clauses partially overlapping with the model list under Art. 3
para. 3 Directive 93/13, a contrario, holding that clauses that do not fall under these articles are
not unfair. This incorrect decision limits the evaluation of clauses under Art. 6:233 sub a BW,
which implements Art. 3 para. 1 Directive 93/13, and it is fortunately contradicted by later
decisions, see Kantonrechter Hoorn 10 Apr. 2006, NJF (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie
Feitenrechtspraak) 2007, p. 252 and Kantonrechter Rotterdam 2 Aug. 2007, Prg. 2008, p. 37.
19 For example, consideration 4 in the preamble to Directive 2005/29 asserts that the lack of
certainty arising from divergence throughout the Union undermines consumer confidence and
poses barriers to the internal market.
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maximum harmonization, currently improves the predictability of private law
throughout the Union is limited as concepts such as ‘unfairness’ in maximum
harmonization directives, such as Directive 2005/29 on unfair commercial
practices, are still interpreted divergently throughout the Union.20 The
fragmented approach of the acquis and the use of directives, which entails that
parties that want to do businesses in another Member State will have to access
legislation and case law adopted and developed in that Member State, further
aggravates the lack of predictability, accessibility, and consistency of harmonized
law. Accordingly, if, for example, a French business that wants to do business
with Dutch consumers assesses its legal position under harmonized law, it will
have to access Dutch legislation transposing directives in the consumer law acquis
as well as Dutch case law applying Dutch implementation law and other
non-harmonized Dutch provisions that will also be applicable.
These problems of unpredictability, inaccessibility, and inconsistency may
well undermine the extent to which the private law acquis is capable of furthering
the internal market and consumer protection. Difficulties with enforcement as
well as problems with the lack of predictability and consistency have however not
been considered in the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) or in the
attempted reform of measures, such as Directive 93/13 on unfair contract
terms.21 If Member States persist in their preference for as little reform as
possible (which, at first sight, benefits the predictable development of the
acquis),22 difficulties will not be addressed: directives will continue to be used,
and they will include blanket clauses, which necessitates knowledge of national
implementation law and case law. It is unlikely that the continuing use of blanket
clauses in directives, even if maximum harmonization is introduced, will lessen
the resistance of national courts, leading to a more consistent interpretation
throughout the Union or even within Member States.
Regrettably, ways to address these problems remain unused. Particularly,
clarifying the obligation of national courts to refer questions to the CJEU may be
helpful. In addition, consistently publishing ADR decisions – an obligation not
imposed by Directive 2013/11 on ADR – may provide more insight in potentially
incorrect decisions that currently remain unchallenged.23 Moreover, national
20 See extensively C.M.D.S. PAVILLON, Open normen in het Europees consumentenrecht, Kluwer,
Deventer 2011.
21 See the proposal for a directive on consumer rights, COM (2008) 614.
22 See the response of the BMJ to the Green Paper on the review of the consumer acquis, COM
(2006) 744, pp. 4, 16, 17, 18, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/
acquis/responses/ms_bundesministerium.pdf.
23 For example, Decision of 29 Sep. 2009, No. 31530, at http://www.degeschillencommissie.nl/
klacht-indienen/eerdere-uitspraken/31530/afwezigheid-van-7-maanden, as well as Decision of 26
Jul. 2006, No. 32021, at http://www.degeschillencommissie.nl/klacht-indienen/eerdere-uitspraken/
32021/artikel-6-237-onder-k-bw-niet-van-toepassing. Similarly, Ch.E. BETHLEM, ‘Beslechting
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reforms may also benefit consistency and predictability. Accordingly, in Dutch
law, the introduction of a national prejudicial procedure24 may generate more
decisions from the Hoge Raad and, possibly, the CJEU, if the Hoge Raad refers
more questions to the CJEU, and increase consistency.
2.2. Poor Regulatory Choices
Arguably, poor regulatory choices and the lack of coordination between existing
and planned measures have contributed to the shortcomings visible in the private
law acquis.
Firstly, part of the lack of predictability visible in the acquis can be traced
to the use of ambiguous phrases and blanket clauses. The introduction of blanket
clauses was not preceded by a careful assessment of the benefits and detriments of
using such clauses in the acquis. Rather, the use of blanket clauses has been based
on the widespread use of such clauses at the national level.25 As detriments were
not adequately foreseen, measures to compensate for potential unpredictability
have not been developed consistently, such as the use of databases or guidelines
for the interpretation of blanket clauses. Moreover, even though European
decision-makers have detected consumers’ lack of awareness,26 this has not
induced them to reconsider methods to increase consumers’ awareness.27 In
addition, disagreement on the future development of European contract law has
undermined solutions that could have strengthened the predictability of this area
of law. Accordingly, the DCFR could have contributed to the predictability and
consistency of the private law acquis by indicating in which way ambiguous
van consumentengeschillen: Hoe alternatief zijn de alternatieven?’, Tijdschrift voor
Consumentenrecht (2006), p. 1, pointed out that inconsistencies between the decisions of ADR
committees and judicial decisions are visible, as well as inconsistencies between the judicial
decisions within the same court and between different courts.
24 See further M.M. STOLP & J.F. DE GROOT, ‘Een nieuwe procesvorm: Het stellen van
prejudiciële vragen aan de Hoge Raad (Art. 392–394 nieuw Rv)’, MvV 2012, p. 165.
25 Thus, the inclusion of Art. 3 Directive 93/13 was based on the widespread use of blanket clauses
throughout the Union, see the German criticism on the proposal for a Directive on unfair
contract terms, COM (90) 322 final, that took successful German law as a starting point, see
Decision of the Bundesrat 1 Mar. 1991, BR-Drucks. 611/90, as well as the recommendation of
the committees of 1 Mar. 1991, BR-Drucks. 611/90, the amended draft COM (93) 11 final, and
the common position of the European Council on the draft, JCP 1992, p. 475.
26 See, for example, the RIA accompanying the proposal for amending Regulation 261/2004 on
passenger rights, SWD (2013) 62 final.
27 Accordingly, the proposal to reform Regulation 261/2004 on passenger rights, COM (2013) 130
final, does not focus on increasing consumers’ awareness, but on strengthening enforcement by
national enforcement bodies – that however rely on consumer complaints. Moreover, clarifying
provisions in the Regulation and introducing information duties may be useful, but the question
remains, how effective these amendments will be if consumers are not aware that they have
rights.
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phrases or blanket clauses should be interpreted, by providing materials relevant
to the interpretation of terms in future conflicts, and by providing
decision-makers with terms that could be used throughout the development of the
acquis. However, the definition of blanket clauses in the DCFR, such as ‘unfair’,
diverges from the definition of the correspondent terms of directives (such as
‘unfairness’ in Directive 93/13). This difference might be seen in the light of the
function of the DCFR to serve as a blueprint for a future contract code, as well as
a blueprint for the draft Common European Sales Law (CESL). Such blueprints
may well include improvements or new suggestions that do not strictly reflect
existing law. However, as a result, the European legislator has not consistently
used the DCFR in revising the acquis and developing new measures, and it may
therefore also be less likely that the DCFR, notwithstanding its value as a source
of comparative legal research, will function as a source that can be relied on for
the interpretation of ambiguous phrases or blanket clauses in the CESL and other
measures relevant for private law.
The lack of a careful assessment of the benefits and detriments of
particular measures is more generally visible in the development of the private
law acquis. Accordingly, the choice for minimum, maximum, and optional
harmonization is not based on a thorough analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of the various degrees of harmonization, which increases the chance
that identical concepts in minimum harmonization measures and maximum
harmonization measures have to be interpreted differently. Moreover, the choice
for maximum harmonization overlooks that this degree of harmonization may
severely complicate the adoption of new measures and the revision of existing
ones. As the length of the legislative process increases, the chance that a measure
becomes outdated increases, which severely diminishes the extent to which these
measures facilitate the internal market or enhance consumer protection,
especially as it becomes easier to circumvent outdated measures. Problems of this
nature were and are particularly visible in the timeshare directive, even when it
aimed for minimum harmonization.28 Maximum harmonization will aggravate,
not mitigate this problem.
Secondly, the development of the acquis is hardly based on a carefully
coordinated, predictable programme, which has further diminished the
predictability and consistency of the acquis. There is little clarity on the legislative
programme, which may moreover be subjected to considerable changes.
Accordingly, more than a decennium after the Commission’s 2001 initiative
to revise European contract law,29 the success of this initiative can be doubted:
the initial proposal to reform eight measures30 has been reduced to
28 See the evaluation of this measure, SEC (1999) 1795 final.
29 COM (2001) 398 final.
30 See further the EC consumer law compendium, available at http://www.eu-consumer-law.org/.
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two,31 while overlapping measures have been reformed simultaneously.32 The
closed process and seemingly arbitrary choices in the review and further
development of the private law acquis moreover indicate more structural
shortcomings in the legislative process.33
As a result of this complicated programme, various measures in the private
law acquis are currently reviewed alongside one another, but sufficient
coordination is absent. This is already visible in the inconsistent use of minimum,
maximum, and optional harmonization.34 One major project, the development of
a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law, is based on the DCFR.
Simultaneously, two central measures for the private law acquis, Directive 93/13
and Directive 99/44 on consumer sales, may be revised in the future.35 These
directives partly use identical concepts (‘consumer’ or ‘contract’), and if the
review of their texts is not sufficiently coordinated, this significantly increases the
chance that these measures will contradict one another. In addition, to avoid
inconsistency, future revision will have to ensure that concepts used in revised
measures will also not clash with other measures, such as Directive 2005/29.
This is difficult, as both the Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights and the CESL
already diverge from the DCFR,36 which may leave a smaller role for the DCFR in
future reform projects. Regrettably, it is not yet clear whether concepts in existing
directives, as well as the DCFR and the CESL, if passed, will play a role in the
revision of these measures. This complicated net of revisions is not likely to
improve the predictability of central measures such as Directive 93/13 or
Directive 99/44. Yet if Member States and other participants in the reform
process insist on amending these directives as little as possible,37 this may leave
room for inconsistencies currently visible between measures.
Against this maze of overlapping reform projects, it is surprising that the
European legislator, rather than finishing and coordinating the revision of
31 Directive 85/577 on doorstep selling and Directive 97/7 on distance sales have been reformed
through Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights.
32 This has resulted in the adoption of Directive 2008/48 on consumer credit and Directive
2008/122 on timeshare.
33 W. DORALT, ‘Strukturelle Schwächen in der Europäisierung des Privatrechts’, RabelsZ 2011,
p. 260.
34 N. REICH, ‘Von der Minimal- zur Voll- zur “Halbharmonisierung”- Ein europäisches
Privatrechtsdrama in fünf Akten’, ZEuP 2010, p. 7.
35 See consideration 62 in the preamble to Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights.
36 See, for divergence between the DCFR and the proposed consumer rights directive,
M.W. HESSELINK, ‘The CFR and the Consumer Rights Directive – Two Worlds Apart?’, ERCL
2009, p. 290. The proposal for a CESL similarly deviates from the DCFR, for example, with
regard to the unfairness of terms (Art. II- 9:403 DCFR, Art. 83 proposed CESL), which makes it
less likely that the DCFR standard will be adopted if Directive 93/13 is revised.
37 Supra n. 2.
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measures, has initiated new projects, without drawing on definitions and model
rules provided by the DCFR.38
2.3. The Need to Reconsider Regulatory Choices through RIAs
The European Commission has recognized the need for a reform of the private
law acquis.39 However, there are no indications that regulatory choices shall be
reconsidered, and problems signalled above are therefore more likely to remain.
RIAs can help improve the private law acquis by prompting reconsideration of
regulatory choices and providing an impetus for improving the legislative process.
Firstly, RIAs should help decision-makers to prevent repeating poor
regulatory choices. This means that techniques that were unsuccessful in the past
should not be re-used without assessing why they were not or not sufficiently
successful. In some cases, however, it is not likely that regulatory choices will be
reconsidered, even if a lack of predictability and consistency has become
apparent. Accordingly, blanket clauses will continue to be used. The use of
blanket clauses is difficult to avoid, but the lack of predictability accompanying
the use of such clauses will likely persist if databases collecting national and
European case law are not established.40 Unpredictability will also remain if
databases such as the CLABB database41 on Directive 93/13, the database on
38 Thus, the DCFR, para. 76, p. 37, expressly states that it does not provide rules for consumer
credit contracts as it concerns projects adopted at a time when the work on the DCFR had already
reached a final phase. Nevertheless, model rules for loan contracts have been established, and
concepts of ‘lenders’ and ‘borrowers’ and their obligations have been established. The comments
to Art. IV.F – 1:101 DCFR, pp. 2456–2457, expressly state that these model rules do not apply to
consumer credit contracts or mortgage credit. The concepts in the DCFR differ from Art. 3
Directive 2008/48 and Art. 3, the proposal for a directive on mortgage credit that refer to
consumers and creditors. Both directives define the concept of consumer more narrowly than the
DCFR that refers to persons acting primarily for purposes not related to their trade, business, or
profession.
39 COM (2001) 398 final.
40 So far, databases have been established for Directive 93/13 on unfair contract terms.
Unfortunately, this database has subsequently been deleted. Similarly, a database on Directive
2005/29 on unfair commercial practices has been established. Directive 2011/83 on consumer
rights does not consider a database, despite the role of the EU consumer law acquis database in
the reform of Directives 85/577 on doorstep selling and 97/7 on distance selling. Other
measures, such as the proposal for a directive reforming Directive 90/314 on package travel,
Directive 2008/48 on consumer credit, Directive 2008/12 on timeshare, or the proposal for a
directive on mortgage credit, COM (2011) 142 final, also do not establish databases.
41 The CLABB database is no longer available.
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Directive 2005/29,42 and the EU consumer law database43 are established, but
not sufficiently used.44 Similarly, guidelines45 are not widely used.46
Currently, it is not clear in which cases these databases will contribute to
the predictable and accessible development of the acquis. Therefore, new
initiatives should not uncritically establish databases to improve the predictable
and consistent interpretation of blanket clauses throughout the Union.
Accordingly, the proposal to collect data on national decisions on the CESL in
Article 14 in the regulation establishing the CESL should carefully consider these
prior experiences. Conversely, if the regulation successfully motivates judges and
legislators to make use of databases collecting national decisions, the use of
databases should be considered more widely and also introduced for other
measures, such as Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights.47
Equally, if Guidance from the Commission is hardly used48 and does not
effectively contribute to the predictable and consistent interpretation of blanket
clauses, the use of Guidance should not be continued. Instead, the use of
Guidance should be critically evaluated. Particularly, an evaluation should look at
the possibility that the use of guidance meets with important objections at the
national level: will the use of Guidance lead to inconsistencies between national
private law and national administrative law? Possibly, such objections may stand
in the way of the use of the Guidance at the national level. The use of this
instrument should only be continued and introduced for other measures, if it is
more consistently and widely used.
The use of self-regulation to reduce unpredictability arising from blanket
clauses has been less prominent. Yet the use of well-established national
self-regulation may be useful in this respect, as acknowledged in Article 6
42 Available at https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/ucp/public/index.cfm?event=public.home.show.
43 Available at http://www.eu-consumer-law.org/.
44 Thus, neither German nor Dutch decisions on either Directive 93/13 or Directive 2005/29
mention foreign decisions or the database.
45 Commission Guidance on the interpretation of Directive 2005/29, SEC (2009) 1666, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/Guidance_UCP_Directive_en.pdf.
46 Although national courts have not referred to the guidance, CJEU 12 May 2011, C-122/10
Konsumentombudsmannen v. Ving Sverige AB [2011] ECR 3903, para. 67, does refer to it. The
report on the application of Directive 2005/29, COM (2013) 139 final, p. 8, gives a different
impression. This somewhat optimistic impression unfortunately remains unsubstantiated, save
for a referral to a single CJEU decision. Other decisions referred to in footnote 13 of the report
do not refer to the Guidance.
47 For example, no database collecting decisions on Directive 2011/83 or laws transposing this
Directive, even though the EU consumer law database played a role in reform of directives on
distance selling and doorstep selling. This possibility seems to have been overlooked. The report
the application on Directive 2005/29, SEC (2009) 139 final, pp. 8–9, suggests merging the EU
consumer law acquis and the database on unfair commercial practices.
48 Supra n. 47.
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Directive 2005/29. Unfortunately, national codes are typically not easily
accessible throughout the Union. European-wide codes may be more accessible,
but it may be doubted whether the development of European self-regulation can
be used to increase predictability. Arguably, RIAs could and should prompt
European decision-makers, who have played a prominent role in the development
of European ‘self’-regulation such as the new EU code for online consumer
rights,49 to reconsider the development of European self-regulation alongside
European measures as a means to improve predictability and consistency.
Previous initiatives, particularly the e-Confidence project,50 a scheme on
European trustmark requirements, based on negotiations between the Burea
Européen des Unions de Consommateurs (BEUC) and Union of Industrial and
Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE), have not been successful.
Regrettably, the new initiative does not consider the lack of success of its
predecessor, but it is not clear why this initiative will be more successful than the
previous one. Theoretically, an important reason for the lack of success of such
initiatives may be that consumers prefer national well-established trustmarks and
more detailed codes of conduct they are already familiar with. The new European
code does not however look at these successful national schemes.51
Meanwhile, other opportunities to improve the predictable and consistent
development of measures in the private law acquis are overlooked. For instance,
opportunities to make judges more aware of relevant decisions through national
training programmes or often-read publications well circulated at the national
level remain unexplored. Similarly, the possibility for CJEU to set more of an
example by referring to databases or indicate the relevance of foreign decisions
for the interpretation of blanket clauses in the acquis should also be considered.
Also, RIAs could prompt an interesting assessment of the success of regulations,
such as Regulation 261/2004. For example, can the use of regulations inhibit
consumer awareness in Member States where most of private law is found in
codes? And if not, why have problems arisen with regard to consumers’ awareness
in the use of regulations? Should these measures therefore be accompanied by
means that help ensure that consumers are sufficiently aware of their rights?
Secondly, shortcomings in the acquis have been traced to the lack of
coordination between overlapping measures. RIAs can also strengthen the private
law acquis in this regard, by providing a better basis for evidence-based
49 See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/code-eu-online-rights.
50 See http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/e-commerce/e-conf_working_annexe.pdf.
51 For Dutch law, successful schemes are the Thuiswinkel Waarborg, see http://www.thuiswinkel.
org/consumenten/, and Stichting Webshop Keurmerk, see http://biedmeerwebwinkels.nl/
Page309/Webshop-Keurmerk.html. The EU code does refer to the EHI trustmark, see
http://www.shopinfo.net/, but it does not refer to other German initiatives approved by the D21
initiative, see http://internet-guetesiegel.de/qualitaetskriterien.
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discussion, thereby improving the legislative process, and by including potential
future reform in sketching the existing legal framework. In turn, more openness
and debate should prompt the legislator to indicate and discuss future plans,
which should lead to more coordination.
3. Shortcomings in the Use of RIAs
RIAs provide a means to help the legislator and other actors in reconsidering
choices that have so far been made in the private law acquis. However, it is
difficult to recognize the potential of RIAs because of the shortcomings in the use
of this instrument.52
An important shortcoming that stands in the way of the added value of
RIAs is the lack of a neutral assessment of the benefits and detriments of a
particular course of action. Thus, costs and benefits of a particular approach are
frequently not evaluated objectively. For example, in the reform of Directive
94/47 on timeshare, the consultation led to suggestions from experienced
Member States for a licensing system. The RIA53 accompanying the proposal does
not assess this option, because the Commission found that introducing licensing
systems would impose too much administrative costs on Member States, which are
better reserved for legislative action. Thus, this option, which has proved
successful at the national level and is suggested by instances currently carrying
the costs of licensing systems, is discarded without properly assessing the costs
and especially the benefits, in terms of consumer protection. However, comparing
the costs and benefits of introducing a licensing system to legislative action – in
the form of revision of the Directive – is difficult as the RIA provides only a very
basic estimation of the costs (of business stakeholders) and benefits. The
estimates are based on figures from stakeholders and ‘the Commission’s expert
judgment’, and the benefits of the ‘vertical legislative reform’ are expressed in
‘+’s rather than exact numbers.54 Possible benefits of licensing systems for the
internal market, for example, the potential successful suppression of malpractices
and the potential increase in consumer confidence in the internal market, are also
not considered.
52 One of the few contributions in this area is W.H. VAN BOOM, ‘The Draft Directive on Consumer
Rights: Choices Made and Arguments Used’, Journal of Contemporary European Research 2009,
p. 452. See on proposal for a Common European Sales Law E.A.G. VAN SCHAGEN, ‘The
Proposal for a Common European Sales Law: How Its Drafting Process Might Affect the Optional
Instrument’s Added Value for Contract Parties and Its Success’, in A.L.M. Keirse & M.B.M. Loos
(eds), Alternative Ways to a ius commune, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2012.
53 SEC (2007) 743, p. 36.
54 SEC (2007) 743, pp. 55, 58.
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Similarly, Micklitz and Reich55 have criticized the one-sided evaluation of
the detriments of minimum harmonization in the RIA accompanying the proposal
for the revision of the consumer credit directive. The one-sided evaluation of
minimum harmonization is also visible in other RIAs56 and draws attention to the
preference for maximum harmonization characterizing the more recent private
law acquis. Particularly, the report on the application of Directive 2005/29 on
unfair commercial practices assumes, rather than assesses, that full
harmonization successfully enhances the internal market.57 If RIAs continue to
assume that minimum harmonization is detrimental and full harmonization is
beneficial, it can be doubted whether the evaluation of Directives 93/13 on unfair
contract terms and Directive 99/44 on consumer sales, which will specifically
target minimum harmonization,58 will entail a balanced evaluation of the benefits
and detriments of minimum harmonization, and it seems highly unlikely that any
other ‘cure’ for these detriments than maximum harmonization will be suggested
in the ‘evaluation’ of these directives.
Because of the above-exemplified lack of neutrality of the RIAs, valuable
suggestions may currently be overlooked and the discussion on the future
development of the acquis may be inhibited. The biased approach in RIAs
prevents the critical evaluation of the use of certain techniques. Consequently,
lessons that could be drawn from problems in the past have been overlooked. For
example, the use of databases, the use of guidance for the interpretation of
blanket clauses, and the development of self-regulation at the European level have
not been particularly successful, but they are introduced in new measures
regardless.
That does not mean that the use of databases and guidance is necessarily
useless; they may be especially important guidelines for administrative bodies
designated to enforce directives containing blanket clauses. Yet for private law,
important limitations to their use should be recognized more clearly. While
databases and guidance may contribute to the predictable and consistent
interpretation of blanket clauses in European measures, blanket clauses such as
Article 3 Directive 93/13 have also been established to allow courts to take into
account parties’ bargaining positions, considerations of reasonableness, and the
55 H.-W. MICKLITZ & N. REICH, ‘Der Kommissionsvorschlag vom 8. 10. 2008 für eine Richtlinie
über “Rechte der Verbraucher”, oder: “der Beginn des Endes einer Ära …”’, EuZW (Europäische
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht) 2009, p. 280.
56 See the impact assessment form to the proposal to revise Directive 87/102 on consumer credit,
COM (2002) 443 final, pp. 82–83, and the impact assessment report accompanying the proposal
to revise Directive 94/47 on timeshare, SEC (2007) 743, pp. 9–10.
57 COM (2013) 139 final, pp. 29–30. The assertion also appears to overlook the possibility for
Member States to retain more stringent provisions on consumer protection for a period of six
years until June 2013, under Art. 3 para. 3 Directive.
58 As announced in consideration 62 of the preamble to Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights.
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overall evaluation of parties’ interests. As these bargaining positions,
considerations and interests may differ throughout the Union, courts’ evaluations
of these circumstances will continue to differ throughout the Union, and foreign
decisions and Guidance may not be decisive for courts evaluating these
circumstances. Initiatives to establish databases and Guidance should allow for
these differences, which also means that, notwithstanding the use of databases
and Guidance, some differences will remain.
The lack of a neutral assessment also diminishes the meaning of RIAs and
increases the chance that they are reduced to a formality. This risk is apparent in
the RIA accompanying the proposal for a draft CESL. Thus, before the draft CESL
was proposed, the Expert Group preparing the proposal was already working on
an optional instrument, apparently regardless of the outcome of the RIA. The
Commission also presented the adoption of the CESL as a future plan in other
policy documents, before the benefits and detriment of this option had been
assessed.59 Thus, regardless of consultations and RIAs, the means for improving
the functioning of the internal market and consumer protection have already been
established.
A more general point of criticism is the lack of openness on RIAs. Despite
the role of the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) in evaluating RIAs,60 it is not
transparent in what way the independence of actors conducting RIAs is
guaranteed, which is especially interesting in the light of the lack of an impartial
assessment of the benefits and detriments in RIAs in the private law acquis. Also,
could and should the Commission or other institutions requiring the use of
(additional) RIAs be held accountable for improving the use of currently visible
shortcomings in RIAs? Such accountability may be difficult to reconcile with the
Commission’s discretion in initiating measures, but the Commission may
nevertheless choose to complement its own RIAs.61 In what cases will the
Commission do so? It is also not clear how much time should typically be
involved in conducting RIAs and how the period needed for RIAs influences the
length of the drafting process of European measures. It is not apparent whether
and in what way proposals and RIAs in the private law acquis may mutually
influence one another, if at all.62 Additionally, there is little clarity on the
59 Thus, the Digital Agenda, COM (2010) 245, p. 13, named the proposal for an optional
instrument on contract law as a policy aim, before the consultation was closed and the benefits
and detriments of this option had been assessed, see SEC (2011) 1165 final.
60 See http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/iab/iab_en.htm
61 Inter-institutional Common Approach to Impact Assessment, 2005, available at http://ec.
europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_in_other/docs/ii_common_approach_to_ia_en.pdf, para. 12.
62 See generally the House of Lords, European Union Committee, Impact Assessments in the EU:
Room for Improvement?, Report 2009–2010, available at http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/61/6102.htm, paras 62–66. Proposals, for example, the
proposal for a regulation establishing a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final,
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question whether stakeholders or experts may influence RIAs or whether RIAs can
sufficiently benefit from practical insights, in accordance with the Commission’s
guidelines.63
4. Starting Points for Improving RIAs and the Private Law Acquis
RIAs could form a valuable starting point for the improvement of the private law
acquis. However, the shortcomings in these instruments make it difficult to
clearly see their potential. As it may take considerable time to draft RIAs,64 they
may currently delay the legislative process while their added value is not clear.
Unfortunately, because there is very little attention for RIAs and possibly also
because they currently do not add to the quality of the private law acquis, there
are few instigations for improving these instruments. Rather, the European
Parliament has positively evaluated the RIA accompanying the proposal for a
CESL,65 remarking that the Commission seems to have followed its own
guidelines,66 despite criticism from the IAB.67
How can actors, particularly the European Commission, improve RIAs and
improve the private law acquis? Clearly, more attention for assessing the impact
of proposed measures is necessary. Particularly, RIAs should be more visible, and
they should be conducted more transparently. It should be clearer what instances
are responsible for conducting RIAs, and they should draw more attention by
discussing and questioning regulatory choices that have remained implicit in the
private law acquis.
Moreover, participants in the debate on European private law should pay
attention to impact assessment reports accompanying new measures and their
shortcomings. Member States have argued for more critical and thorough RIAs,68
indicate that the RIA supports the proposal but do not make clear how the RIA has affected the
choice for a particular policy option, if at all. Comp. A.C.M. MEUWESE, Impact Assessment in
EU Lawmaking, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn 2011, at p. 92, who remarks
that it is ‘strange’ to make proposals and RIA’s public without indicating ‘how one relates to
another’.
63 As indicated in the IIA, supra n. 44, para. 10, and in the Commission’s Impact Assessment
Guidelines, SEC (2009) 92, p. 19, referring to the minimum standards for consultation, COM
(2002) 704 final. There are separate standards for collecting data, see COM (2002) 713 final.
64 For example, the RIA accompanying the proposal for the CESL started in May 2010 and a report
was submitted to the IAB in July 2011, see SEC (2011) 1165, pp. 4, 7. The Impact Assessment
Guidelines, SEC (2009) 92, p. 8, indicate that conducting an RIA ‘normally takes more than 12
months’.
65 Common European Sales Law, Detailed Appraisal by the EP Impact Assessment Unit of the
European Commission’s Impact Assessment, January 2013.
66 European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC (2009) 92.
67 See the opinion of the IAB on the RIA, SEC (2011) 1167.
68 See, for example, the response of the Dutch government to the Green Paper on policy options for
progress toward a European contract law, COM (2010) 348 final, at http://ec.europa.
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without going in much further detail, but these arguments do not suffice. Instead,
participants in the European legislative process should provide constructive
criticism. National Parliaments have already made use of the possibility to lodge
complaints on the subsidiarity of proposals, and they could look to reports from
the IAB criticizing the assessment of subsidiarity – as well as proportionality – in
proposals.69 Meetings between representatives of national parliaments and the
European Parliament70 could perhaps provide a forum for questions on these
issues. More attention for the Impact Assessment Guidelines would further draw
attention to the one-sided evaluation of minimum harmonization. Notably,
current evaluations of measures that also seek to enhance consumer protection
are not in accordance with the requirement that RIAs should also assess social
impacts – for example, in terms of consumer protection.71 Also, the guidelines
indicate that more attention should be paid to the use of co- and self-regulation.72
Looking at possibilities to make well-established self-regulation at the national
level more accessible to parties located in other Member States may be an
especially interesting option to increase consumers’ confidence in the internal
market. Generally, a more critical perspective on regulatory choices would be
welcome.
Similarly, RIAs assertions should be scrutinized much more closely. For
example, the RIA accompanying the proposal for a directive on consumer rights73
asserts that harmonization of the rules on distance selling and doorstep selling
will induce almost half of 75% of traders who use distance communication but
who do not currently trade across borders. The RIA then states that if 31% of
these traders will start trading across borders, the impact of the Directive will be
very significant. If, in accordance with Article 30 Directive 2011/83, the
Commission evaluates the Directive, it would be interesting to see whether the
eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0052/contributions/258_nl.pdf (as well as the responses of
other Member States, including the United Kingdom and Hungary, repeated in the Dutch
response to the Feasibility Study, COM (2011) at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/
expert-group/index_en.htm, and the response to of The Netherlands to the Green Paper on the
review of the consumer acquis, COM (2006) 744 final, at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/
cons_int/safe_shop/acquis/responses/ms_netherlands.pdf, as well as the response of the United
Kingdom that took a similar approach in its response to the 2003 Green Paper, at http://
ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/stakeholders/1–11.pdf).
69 For example, also the opinion of the IAB on the proposal for a directive on mortgage credit, SEC
(2011) 354, at p. 2, and the opinion on the proposals on ADR and ODR, SEC (2011) 1410, at
pp. 1–2.
70 For example, the meeting on the CESL, see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/cms/pid/
1856.
71 SEC (2009) 92, pp. 31 et seq.
72 SEC (2009) 92, p. 16.
73 Impact assessment report, pp. 38–39, available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/
impact_assessment_report_en.pdf.
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full harmonization approach in the Directive has in fact prompted almost half of
the businesses that indicated they would be motivated to engage in cross-border
trade to actually do so. The outcome of such an evaluation would moreover be
interesting in the light of the evaluation of Directives 93/13 and Directive 99/44,
which is to target the question whether minimum harmonization has resulted in
barriers to the internal market. If a RIA contains more general assertions,
evaluating the success of measures on the basis of these assertions will be much
more complicated. For example, if a RIA states that full harmonization, instead of
minimum harmonization, will lead to greater choice for consumers, evaluating
the success of this measure is much more difficult. Specifically, evaluating
whether a lack of greater consumer choice can be attributed to a lack of full
harmonization or whether a lack of more consumer choice can be traced to fierce
competition that has driven smaller businesses across the Union out of business
or to the lack of consumers’ interest in new products from all businesses across
the Union will be difficult. Possibly, more closely scrutinizing predictions in RIAs
in the evaluations of measures will make these assertions much less informal.
Instead, more scrutiny may motivate actors drafting RIAs to substantiate their
assumptions and make their predictions more specific.
Moreover, perhaps, if interested parties are aware of future plans for
harmonization, they can outline whether barriers for the internal market arise and
in which way this could be fixed. Such constructive criticism however not only
presupposes a thorough knowledge of comparative law, but also familiarity with
national, cross-border, and European practice.74 Currently, however, specialists in
national private law and practitioners hardly participate in the European debate
on the development of the private law acquis, especially when compared to
participation in legislative chances at the national level. Possibly, these actors may
be motivated to participate if they have a clear, direct interest in doing so, which
currently may not always be the case. The wording of projects – a ‘Feasibility
Study’ or a ‘Draft Common Frame of Reference’ – obscures the potential impact
of these projects on national private law and national and cross-border practice.
The closed process and the lack of openness on future action may further inhibit
national actors from participating. In other words, initiatives for advancing the
internal market should be based on more bottom-up participation. Member States
are well placed to prompt more attention to both European consultations and
RIAs by initiating additional consultations and RIAs at the national level.
In itself, these developments would already be a significant improvement
that would increase the extent to which the acquis reflects national and
cross-border practices. These views and the options suggested by national actors
74 Interestingly, successful measures such as Directive 2002/47 on financial collateral
arrangements have been preceded by considerable involvement from (a) stakeholder(s). See the
evaluation of this measures, COM (2006) 833 final.
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could, in turn, provide a starting point for RIAs. If actors perceive that their
options are approved or discarded by RIAs, this may be a point of interest for
them. Yet although wider participation may be beneficial and prompt considerable
improvement, actors should also be motivated to consider RIAs. If RIAs are
performed at a national level and predict the impact of future measures in more
detail, this may prompt more detailed reactions. The use of national materials is
moreover indicated by Commission guidelines.75 It may also be helpful if
consultations enquire after practitioners’ and stakeholders’ experiences and
success stories in enhancing consumer confidence and encouraging trade.
Questions should also be asked on the experiences of traders so far – have they
encountered a lack of predictability, do courts and practitioners make use of the
database established by a measure, and are consumers sufficiently aware of their
rights? This may be an opportunity for stakeholders, experts, and practitioners to
express (dis)satisfaction and an opportunity to propose alternatives. National
practitioners and experts may also be better placed to draw attention to the use of
national success stories that may enhance consumer confidence in cross-border
situations.
5. Conclusion
RIAs could be an important means for addressing the unpredictability,
inconsistency, and inaccessibility in the private law acquis. Particularly, RIAs
could draw attention to implicit regulatory choices and sketch alternative or
additional measures that may limit unpredictability arising from the use of blanket
clauses as well as provide a basis for a more consistent use of either minimum,
maximum, optional, or another degree of harmonization and enhance the
coordination between measures in the private law acquis. However, these
improvements require that shortcomings in RIAs are addressed and the use of
RIAs in the private law acquis needs to be drastically improved. Unfortunately, the
main difficulty lies in prompting the instances responsible for RIAs to improve
the use of RIAs. Particularly, prompting relevant parties to respond may be
difficult – it may require a rather radical change in the approach adopted in the
acquis so far. However, these difficulties are well worth it, considering the
potential for improvement in the private law acquis.
75 SEC (2009) 92, at p. 18.
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